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Abstract 
This paper addresses issues relevant to a critical problem in economic development: how to get 
rapid pro-poor economic growth in poor rural areas in Africa and South Asia where most of the 
world’s dollar a day poor live. It examines constraints to the development of coordinated 
exchange systems in poor rural areas, focusing on the core problem of thin markets and low 
density of economic activity in these areas. Transaction cost and risk analysis is integrated into a 
conventional neoclassical production economics framework to describe the existence of low level 
equilibrium traps in transactions and supply chains and to generate important insights for 
development policy. 
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This paper addresses issues relevant to a critical problem in economic development: how to get 
rapid pro-poor economic growth in poor rural areas in Africa and South Asia where most of the 
world’s dollar a day poor live. It examines constraints to the development of coordinated 
exchange systems in poor rural areas, focusing on the core problem of thin markets and low 
density of economic activity in these areas. Transaction cost and risk analysis is integrated into a 
conventional neoclassical production economics framework to describe the existence of low level 
equilibrium traps in transactions and supply chains and to generate important insights for 
development policy. 
 
1 Introduction 
Economic development involves, inter alia, a process where technical and institutional change 
with increasing specialisation and trade shift supply and demand curves to the right and reduce 
transaction costs, increasing supply and demand (and their elasticities) and consumer and 
producer surpluses.  Both technical and institutional change are critical drivers in this as technical 
change is needed to increase productivity and reduce inputs (and costs) needed for production, 
while institutional change is needed to reduce the costs and raise the efficiency of exchange of 
resources, goods and services between the owners of factors of production, producers of 
intermediate and final goods and services, and consumers. This exchange needs to be both low 
cost and coordinated (the latter so that resource use in productive activities and exchanges are 
directed towards meeting individuals’ and communities’ wants).   
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Current development orthodoxy places strong emphasis on the importance of both technical 
change and exchange in rural development. While there are disagreements about the nature of 
technical change needed in different areas, and the suitability of existing technologies for today’s 
poor areas, there is broad agreement first of the need for public investments in technology 
development and second that there is a considerable stock of technologies currently on the shelf 
but held back by difficulties with ‘market access’, where ‘market access’ refers to access to 
opportunities for efficient and effective exchange. It is also agreed that this requires institutional 
development, but the nature of such development is disputed. Policies promoting access to 
efficient and effective exchange have changed markedly over the last 50 years, from reliance on 
state-led to market-led solutions, and continue to be debated. Over this period there have been 
some remarkable development successes within state-led systems, as well as serious failures. 
Similarly market-led approaches have had some successes, but they have generally failed to 
support significant productivity growth among staple crops in poor rural areas, as indicated in 
table 1.  
Table 1 provides an admittedly generalised but nevertheless helpful summary of successes and 
failures of state and market-led approaches to agricultural development, using information drawn 
from a range of reviews (Dorward et al., 2004a; Dorward et al., 2004b; Kherallah et al., 2002, 
Poulton et al., 2004; Shepherd and Farolfi, 1999). The table distinguishes between state-led and 
market-led (liberalisation) policy approaches to agricultural development in poor rural 
economies, and, within these, experience with staple crops and cash crops. The term ‘state-led’ 
describes  approaches involving active state intervention in output, input and financial markets 
whereas ‘market-led’ describes approaches involving a withdrawal of the state from direct 
intervention in these activities and reliance on private sector investment. The outcomes from 
these approaches with these different types of crops are subjectively assessed in terms of the 
extent to which they have stimulated or provided an environment for sustainable intensification of 
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production (that is, significant and durable increases in land and labour productivity). The table 
does not attempt to be exhaustive, but to provide examples and illustrations of success and 
failure. Nevertheless the conclusions are striking. First, and not unexpectedly, we find widespread 
failure under both state-led and market-led policies, affecting both staple food and cash crops. 
Second, and more significantly, we are unable to identify a significant example of sustainable 
intensification of staple crops1 under market-led approaches. Even with cash crops many of the 
successes under market-led approaches involve non-market arrangements between private 
players, arrangements which often do not conform to the competitive ideal promoted in the 
rhetoric of liberalisation2.  
TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
The reasons for market-led approaches’ widely recognised lack of success in stimulating stable 
food crop intensification have been widely debated. Dorward et al., 2005b characterise three main 
explanations for liberalisation failures: ‘partial liberalisation’, ‘weak institutions’, and 
‘coordination failures’. An important fourth explanation is widespread under-investment in the 
public goods (research, extension and transport infrastructure) (Jayne pers comm.; Kherallah et 
al., 2002). The ‘partial liberalisation’ argument is that partial rather than complete withdrawal of 
the state together with real or perceived threats of policy reversals and continued price controls, 
rent seeking and threats from parastatals and politicians and bureaucrats have depressed returns 
and increased risks to private investors (see, for example, Kherallah et al., 2000; Jayne et al., 
2002). The ‘weak institutions’ argument explains slow market development in terms of weak 
institutional support (for example World Bank, 2000; World Bank, 2002) with cultural, political 
and legal factors undermining clear property rights and investment incentives. Coordination 
failure arguments are critical of liberalisation policies’ conceptualisation of markets as efficient 
and effective exchange mechanisms in poor rural areas. They also question their assumptions 
about the political economy of reform - namely, that it is in governments’, politicians’ and 
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bureaucrats’ interests to withdraw from patronage  in politically sensitive and rent-rich staple 
food markets. This critique of liberalised staple crop markets in poor rural areas does not deny the 
validity of the partial liberalisation and weak institutions explanations of liberalisation failures. It 
suggests, however, that they do not take sufficient account of fundamental problems of staple 
crop supply chains in poor rural areas (supply chains include all actors involved in supplying 
financial and physical inputs and in producing, processing, distributing and selling a product). We 
highlight two such problems. First, institutional weaknesses lead to particular coordination 
problems in poor rural areas, problems  which pose major difficulties for liberalised markets in 
driving and supporting sustainable intensification of staple food crop systems. Second, politicians 
and bureaucrats find it very difficult to let go of and liberalise staple food markets, as a result 
both of legitimate political and welfare concerns and of illegitimate interests in patronage and 
rents 3. Given these problems it is not enough for proponents of the ‘partial liberalisation’ and 
‘weak institutions’ arguments to call for more thorough and committed liberalisation and stronger 
institutions. Government failures to act on these in the past are symptoms of more fundamental 
systemic coordination and political economy constraints. We therefore need to go further by 
identifying policies that actually succeed in driving and supporting sustainable intensification of 
staple food crop systems and by developing mechanisms that make the implementation of reform 
more -compatible with the incentives implied in a country’s political economy.  
 In this paper we address the first of the two problems described above, institutional weaknesses 
inhibiting sustainable intensification of staple food crop systems . We take further an earlier 
framework integrating critical insights from different sides of these debates (see for example 
Kydd and Dorward, 2004; Dorward et al., 2005a; Dorward et al., 2005b). Our analysis below is 
relevant to poor rural economies dominated by smallholder agriculture, such as are to be found 
throughout Africa and South Asia4 and where world poverty is currently concentrated. Our focus 
is motivated by agriculture’s potential to power broader economic growth through a number of 
linkages to the wider economy - including higher agricultural incomes, better food availability 
and lower food prices. These factors between them improve nutrition, raise labour productivity 
and create demand in non-agricultural sectors. Historically, these linkages have allowed the 
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economy to enter the ‘agricultural transformation’, a growth path where productivity and 
employment in agriculture initially increase, fuelling the rise of other sectors who subsequently 
becomes engines of growth as labour and other resources flow out of agriculture and the economy 
shifts to a manufacturing and services base (Timmer, 1988).  We therefore start from the premise 
that developing smallholders’ agricultural productivity in these settings is key to broader 
economic development and poverty reduction (see Bezemer and Heady, 2008, for more extensive 
presentation of this argument). We first examine constraints to the development of coordinated 
exchange systems in poor rural areas, focusing on the core problem of thin markets and low 
density of economic activity in these areas. We then integrate New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
analysis of transaction costs and risks into a conventional neoclassical production economics 
framework. This framework then allows us to describe the existence of low level equilibrium 
traps in transactions and supply chains, and to glean important insights for development policy.  
2 Poor rural areas, thin markets and the problem of coordinated exchange 
 Competitive markets are often considered to provide an effective mechanism for (coordinated) 
exchange5. The basic market coordination mechanism is price: market prices signal buyers’ 
willingness to pay a set amount for a good or service, and potential suppliers are then willing to 
incur costs of supply if these are lower than price.  
In poor rural areas access to profitable opportunities for exchange is, however, often problematic. 
Such areas are characterised by low densities of economic activity. This is linked to a set of 
generic problems including poor roads and telecommunications; poor human health; an 
undeveloped monetary economy with a narrow base; thin markets (for agricultural inputs, outputs 
and finance); and poor information (particularly in agriculture, on prices, on new technologies, 
and on potential contracting partners). Seasonality, production and price risks, small land 
holdings and subsistence production in smallholder agriculture pose problems in cash, labour and 
inventory management, and lead to small transactions and small volumes of trade. There are 
particular and well known difficulties affecting the supply of and demand for financial services. 
These generic problems together with a weak institutional environment then lead to difficulties in 
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enforcing impersonal contracts, high transaction risks (discussed in more detail later), and high 
per unit transaction costs (Dorward et al., 2005b). As a result there are few investment 
opportunities offering high returns, and hence a vicious circle of under-development. The result 
can be a ‘low level equilibrium trap’, with a set of mutually self-sustaining, generic problems in a 
vicious cycle of under-development, as illustrated in figure 1. 
Figure 1 AROUND HERE 
Difficulties with competitive markets as effective and efficient mechanisms for coordinated 
exchange are not, however, limited, to poor rural economies. Market failures and the use of non-
market mechanisms for coordinated exchange are widespread in more developed economies too. 
We define market failures broadly as situations where the profits from engaging in a transaction 
are not sufficient to justify the transaction costs and risks6 involved in establishing and 
implementing that transaction, even though underlying prices (or utilities) and technical 
efficiency would suggest that the transaction should be profitable with lower (more reasonable) 
transaction risks and costs. These transaction costs may involve (a) the establishment and 
enforcement of exclusive property rights and/ or (b) the definition and enforcement of attributes 
of the good or service being exchanged. Transaction risks represent the losses incurred as a result 
of the failure (a) in enforcing exclusive property rights, (b) in enforcing required attributes, (c) in 
completing the intended transaction or (d) in protecting transaction benefits from third party 
predation.  
Problems with regard to (a) arise with conventionally defined public goods and externalities. 
Problems with regard to (b), (c) and (d), however, can arise with private goods when there are 
institutional and/or informational difficulties first in obtaining information about goods, services 
and parties involved in an exchange, second in enforcing agreements, and third in protecting and 
enforcing property rights. The first of these difficulties we analyse as a failure in commitment, the 
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second as a problem of opportunism, and the third as a problem of rent seeking. Both 
commitment failure and opportunism contribute to and are aspects of wider problems of 
coordination in exchange. 7 Three types of opportunism can be identified: monopolistic 
opportunism, specification opportunism, and strategic default (Poulton et al., 2005, Poulton et al., 
1998). Smallholder farmers’ transaction costs are also increased by small transactions, 
dysfunctional service delivery, and limited farmer ‘voice’ (Poulton et al., 2005).  
Transaction cost and risk problems are considered by Williamson (Williamson, O.E., 1985; 
Williamson, O.E., 1991; Williamson, J., 1994) in his analysis of the way that firms in developed 
economies structure institutional arrangements in the context of their institutional environment.  
Williamson argues that under conditions of low ‘asset specificity’  (that is, when a firm does not 
invest significant assets in a particular transaction) and/or when risks of transaction failure are 
low (due to low information and enforcement costs) then competitive or spot market transactions 
are more efficient and effective than other forms of exchange. However, if asset specificity is 
high (that is, there are significant investments in assets specific to a particular transaction, with 
the effective loss of the value of investments in those assets if the transaction fails) and if 
additionally risks of transaction failure are high (due to high information and enforcement costs) 
then, as Williamson argues, competitive or spot market transactions are less efficient and 
effective than other forms of exchange, such as hierarchical arrangements within firms or ‘hybrid 
arrangements’ involving longer term contractual relationships between firms. These hierarchical 
and hybrid arrangements are coordination mechanisms to overcome the commitment problem 
between two parties prior to a transaction and to reduce the risks of opportunistic behaviour by 
other parties once they have committed to it 8. 
This analysis is relevant to poor rural areas because Williamson’s ‘asset specificity’ is the result 
of thin markets (Dorward  and Kydd, 2004): assets are specific to a particular transaction because 
there are no other parties interested in that transaction. The commitment and opportunism 
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problems of asset specificity are therefore a generic problem wherever new markets need to be 
developed.  
Thus far our analysis of the problems constraining the development of and access to coordinated 
exchange systems in poor rural economies has focused mainly on transaction costs and risks 
associated with low volumes, commitment failure and opportunism. Another sphere of 
increasingly recognised problems associated with poor governance concerns ‘rent seeking’. This 
comprises the extraction of legitimate or illegitimate taxes, license fees or bribes by powerful 
players (such as politicians, civil servants, criminals or formal or informal groups or individuals) 
in situations of weak or predatory governance. Paying and/or evading ‘rents’ represent another 
major source of cost and uncertainty to economic actors in poor rural areas. As noted earlier, this 
can be conceptualised as a problem in protecting transaction benefits from third party predation. 
The problem arises from difficulties in protecting and enforcing property rights as a result of 
weak or inappropriate institutions: there are thus parallels with public good problems, but here 
private goods are affected. 
In the remainder of this paper we extend and formalise a model  initially reported in Kydd and 
Dorward, 2004 to (a) demonstrate how transaction costs and risks associated with commitment 
failure, opportunism and rent seeking can lead to low level equilibrium traps, and (b) discuss 
policies and mechanisms for overcoming these. 
3 A model of coordination failure  
We consider a situation where a set of actors (let us say farmers) face a two stage investment 
problem, in which they must make stage 1 investments in assets specific to a particular 
transaction in order to reap net revenues in stage 2. Their revenues in stage 2, however, are 
determined not only by the scale of their own stage 1 investments, but also by the scale of stage 1 
investments by potential transaction partners (let us say produce buyers) where potential 
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transaction partners’ investments are not known to farmers when they make stage 1 investments. 
In a thin market this leads to potential commitment failure problems (limited stage 1 investment 
by buyers may lead to insufficient demand for the products of farmers’ stage 1 investments).  It 
may also allow opportunism by buyers at farmers’ expense if there is over-production by farmers 
relative to buyers’ capacity (determined by buyers’ stage 1 investments) 9.  
This is a “prisoners’ dilemma” type problem and its impact on the investment decisions of 
individual farmers’ can be examined in terms of marginal investment analysis. Figure 2 shows the 
changes in marginal factor costs (including transaction costs in financing and purchasing inputs)10 
and in marginal value product of individual farmers’ seasonal investments in transformation costs 
for production of a staple crop such as maize11. Marginal value product is adjusted to allow for 
transaction costs and for risks in yield and sales  – including price risk and the risk of transaction 
failure. The different curves describe conditions of different behaviour by buyers. Risk and 
transaction cost adjusted marginal value product falls rapidly with increasing investments if a 
smallholder invests in increased production without complementary investments by produce 
buyers in buying capacity (MVP0). This occurs because with investment beyond that required to 
meet subsistence needs, the MVP curve slopes steeply downwards because production beyond 
subsistence needs is subject to risks and increased transaction costs from either (a) searching for 
but failing to find a buyer or (b) searching for and finding a buyer but being prone to 
opportunistic behaviour by the buyer. In either case the farmer will expect a low price and may 
incur high transaction costs. The result is risk and transaction cost adjusted profit maximisation at 
a low equilibrium position where risk and transaction cost adjusted MVP is equal to total 
marginal factor cost including transaction costs (MFC1). This will occur around subsistence 
production (with investment E0), with only small surplus sales in good and normal years (the 
small surplus representing a safety margin against lower production or increased subsistence 
needs in adverse years).  
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 Figure 2 AROUND HERE 
In a thick market, however, there are complementary investments by a number of produce buyers 
and (as a result of competitive pressures) less scope for them to behave opportunistically. Farmers 
can expect higher sales prices and hence higher risk and transaction cost adjusted marginal value 
product (MVP1) for seasonal investments in surplus staple crop production. They can also expect 
a lower MFC curve as thicker markets lead to lower input prices and lower transaction costs in 
obtaining and financing inputs. The result is profit maximisation at higher levels of investment 
and net income, with a significant marketable surplus beyond the households’ own subsistence 
needs (with investment E1 in figure 2). 
These relationships can be expressed as a conventional production economics problem with the 
addition of terms reflecting transaction costs and risks: 
 
)( ijijijijijiij OCTIRfMax −−−−=Π       (1) 
 
where Πij is the risk adjusted net revenue gained by the jth actor engaging in activity of type i in a 
supply chain (where i = 1 at the upstream end of the chain), fi is a function for risk adjusted net 
revenue from transactions engaged in by actors engaged in activity of type i, Rij represents gross 
benefits (adjusted for yield risks), Iij represents seasonal investment, and Tij, Cij, and Oij, are the 
transaction costs and risks incurred in both input and output transactions as a result of rent 
seeking behaviour, commitment problems, and opportunism respectively.  
Tij, the transaction costs and risks 12 incurred as a result of rent seeking behaviour, will depend 
upon a number of variables, as shown in equation 2.  
),,,,,,,( )1()1( ijijijiiiijijijij ZWEnnnSItT −+=                            (2) 
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Where  ti   is   a cost function for rents and for costs incurred in reducing rents in transactions 
engaged in by actors engaged in activity type i  (allowing for actors’ risk 
preferences) 
Sij =  a measure of asset specificity for actor j  investing in activity type i 
ni =  the number of actors engaged in activity type i, (and similarly for n(i-1) and n(i+1), 
where i-1 and i+1 represent potential transaction partners up and down the supply 
chain from actors engaged in activity type i).  
 Eij =  a measure of the strength of the institutional environment in protecting the 
property rights of actor j investing in activity type i 
 Wij =  a measure of power of actor j investing in activity type i 
 Zij =  a measure of risk aversion of actor j investing in activity type i 
 
We may expect ni to be related to some function of ∑
in
j
ijI  , the total investment by all actors of 
type i 
Similar relationships would apply to n(i+1) and n(i-1) so that equation 2 can be rewritten as  
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We now consider the likely impact of each of the independent variables on rent costs and risks.  
Increases in investments (Iij) would be expected to increase Tij where asset specificity (Sij) is high. 
The effect of the number of players and of total investments by all actors of types i, i+1 and i-1 
are ambiguous as, for example,  increases in the number of actors may make rent seeking 
activities more profitable (attracting rent seeking activity)  or increase incentives and 
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opportunities for collective action to reduce rent seeking. The impacts of the last three variables 
are, however, much clearer – a stronger institutional environment (Eij) should reduce rent seeking 
risks and hence costs, as should increased actor power (Wij). Increased risk aversion (Zij) will 
increase perceived risks and costs.  
Transaction costs and risks incurred as a result of commitment problems and opportunism can be 
analysed in a similar way:  
),,,,,,,(
11
)1()1( ijijij
n
j
ji
n
j
ij
n
j
jiijijijij ZWEIIISIcC
iii
∑∑∑
−+
−+=                    (4) 
),,,,,,,(
11
)1()1( ijijij
n
j
ji
n
j
ij
n
j
jiijijijij ZWEIIISIoO
iii
∑∑∑
−+
−+=                      (5) 
However the relationships between the different variables and perceived costs will not always be 
the same across the different rent, commitment and opportunism functions. High asset specificity 
and risk aversion will tend to increase transaction risks and costs in all functions and a strong 
institutional environment and greater actor power will tend to reduce transaction risks and costs in 
all functions. However the effects of increases in numbers of players and in total investments 
(across actors) are not so clear cut. Although these are likely to reduce commitment and 
opportunism risks and costs as a result of thicker markets, in some types of transaction (notably 
credit transactions and those requiring coordinated quality grading) increased numbers of players 
tend to increase these risks and costs by increasing costs and difficulties in coordination of 
collective action (see for example Poulton et al., 2004).  
We now revisit figure 2 and relate it to equation 1. We differentiate equation 1 with respect to Iij 
as follows 13: 
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Since Tij, Cij and Oij represent transaction costs and risks across both input and output transactions 
and Rij and Iij do not allow for transaction costs and risks (in output and input transactions 
respectively), equation 6 is not exactly comparable to figure 2. In figure 2 MVP is adjusted for 
transaction costs and risks for output transactions and MFC is adjusted for transaction costs and 
risks for input transactions. Figure 3 therefore recasts figure 2 with MVP and MFC defined more 
conventionally but with the three types of transaction costs and risks for both output and input 
transactions explicitly added as additional marginal factor costs above the basic marginal factor 
costs of investments. A further difference between figures 2 and 3 is that the situations of high 
and low transactions risks and costs in thin and thick markets shown by two different sets of 
curves in figure 2 are shown as separate graphs in figures 3a and 3b.    
As with figure 2, the transaction costs and risks in figures 3a and 3b are drawn to represent 
stylised conditions facing producers of a staple food crop such as maize. At low levels of 
production only household resources are used (land, labour, retained seed) and all produce is for 
domestic consumption, so that there are no commitment or opportunism risks or costs. The 
standing crop and harvested grain are, however, subject to some rent risks and/or costs.  Higher 
levels of production involve both use of purchased inputs (labour, fertilisers, seed and seasonal 
finance for example) and output sales. These transactions are subject to commitment, 
opportunism and rent risks and costs, and hence there is a sudden increase in marginal costs with 
this engagement in input and output transactions, but, as figures 3a and 3b show, the size of this 
increase varies between thin and thick markets.  There are no a priori reasons for expecting 
further rises or falls in marginal costs and risks of opportunism, commitment and rent after this 
step, and they are therefore assumed to remain constant.  
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 Figure 3a AROUND HERE 
Figure 3b AROUND HERE 
The MVP curve is also drawn to represent stylised conditions facing producers of a staple food 
crop such as maize. At low levels of production the output is used for domestic consumption and 
hence valued at consumer purchase price. As production increases and household requirements 
are satisfied then further production is sold, earning a lower farmgate price (Low, 1986). This 
leads to a sudden drop in MVP. MVP is then assumed to continue to decline with continuing 
investment due to diminishing marginal returns.  
The result of the interaction of the MVP, MFC and marginal transaction cost/risk curves in figure 
3 is, as in figure 2, different profit maximising levels of investment under thin and thick market 
conditions, with low and high levels of investment. Since other market players (input sellers, 
seasonal finance providers and output traders for example) may face similar situations, thin 
market situations may lead to the existence of low level equilibria. We investigate this by 
extending our analysis of individual farmers to consider the effects of changes in total 
investments by all actors engaging in a particular type of transaction. We begin from equation (1), 
and sum this across all actors14: 
)∑∑∑∑∑∑ −−−−=Π
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We then differentiate this with respect to total investments ∑
ij
ijI to allow a comparison of 
marginal value product and marginal factors costs across all actors in the supply chain, to give: 
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We can then examine earlier equations to consider the likely behaviour of marginal value product 
and the different marginal costs and risks where  
 
∑
∑
=
ij
ij
ij
ij
Id
Rd
MVP      and       1+++=
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
∑
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
ij
Id
Od
Id
Cd
Id
Td
MFC  
 
MVP is likely to increase and then decline with economies and diseconomies of scale. Output 
prices are also likely to become more adverse at high levels of investment, so that after an initial 
increase of MVP it will then decline at higher levels of total investment.  
Changes in MFC with increasing supply chain investment depend upon the behaviour of costs 
and risks associated with rent, opportunism and commitment failure, and we therefore consider 
these in turn. . 
• It is not clear how marginal rent costs and risks will change with increasing total 
investments. One might postulate a small decline as rent seekers take slightly declining 
shares but still increase their total income as the amount of economic activity associated 
with a particular transactions or set of transactions increases. Alternatively, new rent 
seekers may become interested as the size of a ‘honey pot’ grows, so that marginal costs 
and risks of rents increase with increasing volumes of activity. Rent risks (and costs) may 
also change with market extension (see below).15  
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• One would generally expect marginal commitment and opportunism costs and risks to fall 
with increasing volumes of total investment as (a) thicker ‘markets’ reduce the risks of 
coordination failure and (b) larger transactions lead to lower per unit transaction costs. 
However, there may also be thresholds associated with geographical expansion of markets, 
with higher costs and risks in more far-flung ‘markets’. Thus, as noted earlier, figure 3 
shows commitment and opportunism costs and risks to be very low for low levels of farm 
investment producing only for subsistence consumption, but then increasing with larger 
investments as surplus production needs to be sold. One can envisage similar increases in 
coordination and rent costs as production increases beyond the demand capacity of village 
or locality ‘markets’ (where social links are important for communication, commitment and 
enforcement in transactions) to wider national markets, or where increasing supplies to 
national markets attract new entrants (among sellers and buyers) so that established buyers 
and sellers (with mutual trust) no longer dominate transactions.   Similarly, expansion from 
national to international markets is likely to incur new and higher commitment and 
opportunism costs. Also, as noted earlier, for some types of transaction (notably credit 
transactions and those requiring coordinated quality grading) increased numbers of players 
tend to increase these risks and costs (Poulton, C. et al., 2004). 
The point of interest that arises from this discussion is that if we look at marginal value products 
and marginal factor costs from incremental investments in the supply chain as a whole, at certain 
levels of investment the MVP of increasing investment may fall more slowly than the total MFC 
of such investments. If this occurs where the MVP is lower than the MFC and the MVP curve 
crosses the total MFC curve from below, then a low level equilibrium trap will arise16. This is 
illustrated in figure 4, for two different situations.  
Figure 4a  AROUND HERE 
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Figure 4a shows commitment and opportunism costs, and hence total MFC, consistently falling as 
total investments increase. At zero investment the total MFC is higher than MVP and hence, 
following standard marginal analysis, there are no incentives for players to invest17. Only if total 
supply chain investments are above a certain level (‘A’ in figure 4a) will MVP be greater than 
MFC, at which point it becomes rational for players to invest, up to the equilibrium point ‘B’ 
where MVP is again overtaken by MFC.  In Figure 4a, therefore, a low level equilibrium trap 
exists at zero levels of investment and despite the potential existence of profitable opportunities 
beyond ‘A’ and a high level equilibrium at B, the industry will not develop without external 
intervention or coordination to lift investments above ‘A’ and/or guarantees that an investor will 
be able to capture benefits from making investments above ‘A’.18  
Examples of situations with low level equilibria at zero investment do not arise with staple crops 
(these are discussed below) but with some cash crops. Prior to the introduction and uptake of a 
cash crop into smallholder farming in an area, there are high ‘first mover’ costs and risks for 
smallholder farmers and buyers. Where there are high potential gains from a supply chain, a 
buyer with a natural or regulated monopsony may be prepared to take risks in making initial large 
scale investments in buying and/or processing facilities if he/she is confident (a) of being able to 
offer smallholders opportunities that will induce them to enter production and (b) of being able to 
capture returns to that investment through purchases of smallholder production. The development 
of smallholder sugar and tea industries and contract farming enterprises provide common 
examples of such situations in Africa. Where land availability and land tenure arrangements allow 
it, such investments may be linked to investment in a nuclear estate (which reduces reliance on 
smallholder production). These examples involve buyers making initial risky investments in 
purchasing facilities to cross the threshold at point ‘A’ in figure 4a and in the establishment of 
longer term coordination relationships along the supply chain. 
Figure 4b  AROUND HERE 
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Figure 4b shows commitment and opportunism costs, and hence total MFC, rising and then 
falling as total investments increase. Such a situation might be expected with staple food crop 
production and would be consistent with the pattern of farm costs described in figure 3. Here 
MVP is higher than total MFC at very low levels of investment, but then total MFC increases 
rapidly with increasing investment, as a result of rising transaction costs and risks, so that total 
MFC becomes greater than MFC (at point ‘A’ in figure 4b). This represents an equilibrium as 
there is no incentive for rational individual players to increase their investments further.  Point 
‘A’ is, however, a low level equilibrium, as with increasing total supply chain investment the total 
MFC falls faster than MVP, so that at point ‘B’ total MFC falls below MVP, and further 
investment again becomes rational, up to  point ‘C’, the high level equilibrium. As with Figure 
4a, the industry will not develop beyond the low level equilibrium without external intervention 
or coordination to lift investments beyond the point where MVP rises above MFC (in this case 
point ‘B’).  
Examples of commodities where shifts from low to high level equilibria require develop in of 
particular coordination mechanisms are found in different African cotton production systems with 
low and high use of external inputs (Poulton et al, 2004), in dairy production systems in East 
Africa (see Staal et al, 1997), low and high intensity ‘local’ and ‘hybrid’ maize production 
systems in Malawi where promotion of high intensity production has required substantial 
investment (e.g. Smale, 1995), and in successful green revolutions in Asia (see market-led 
failures and state-led successes with staples in table 1 and Dorward et al, 2004b). 
4 Discussion 
We concentrate our discussion first on the validity of the analysis put forward here, and second 
on its implications for policy and research. 
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4.1 Validity of the analysis 
The validity of the analysis presented here depends upon (a) the extent to which the model 
presented here properly represents transaction risk and cost difficulties facing different individual 
actors in a particular type of transaction, and their interaction , and (b) the extent to which rent, 
commitment and opportunism costs behave in the way that is postulated in figures 4a and 4b. 
The arguments in the analysis are intuitively appealing and consistent both with poor rural 
economy conditions as outlined in parts 1 and 2 of this paper and with other writings on 
coordination (see for example discussion in Kydd and Dorward, 2004 of North, 1990; North, 
1995, Hall and Soskice, 2001, Hoff, 2000 and  Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). The independent 
additive treatment of the different transaction risks and costs is clearly a simplification of the real 
interactions that exist in quite complex functions. The definition of these functions and of some of 
the variables present empirical challenges, but these difficulties are unlikely to significantly 
detract from the general analysis.  
4.2 Implications for policy and research 
Our analysis as summarised in figure 4 integrates traditional production economics with analysis 
of transaction costs and coordination problems, and we suggest two ways in which this analysis 
can yield important policy insights – first through its integration of different types of supply chain 
costs and risks into a unified conceptual framework, and second through its description of low 
level equilibrium traps.  
First, and most obviously, the integration of transformation, rent seeking, opportunism and 
commitment costs and risks in a unified conceptual framework, together with marginal value 
products to investment, may encourage policy analysts to move away from the often sterile and 
polarized debate about state and market-led policies. Instead it may assist them to consider which 
kinds of costs and risks present the greatest constraint to increased production under different 
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types of institutional arrangements, which costs and risks may most easily be reduced, and hence 
where policy investment (in the development of different institutional arrangements, 
infrastructure or technical change, for example) can be most effectively and efficiently focused to 
raise productivity and incentives for increased investment. Practical application of this holistic 
analysis, however, will require the development of practical methodologies for estimating these 
different kinds of costs and risks for different supply chain actors, and this represents an 
important research challenge.  
Second, and perhaps of more immediate intuitive benefit, the framework’s description of low 
level equilibrium traps also allows identification of processes by which actors engaged in 
particular transactions may escape from low level equilibrium traps or, in the absence of such 
traps, increase the efficiency of their activities and the returns to their investments. Kydd and 
Dorward (2004) suggest three such processes: threshold shifting, pump priming investment, and 
coordination.  
The first of these processes, threshold shifting, involves movement of the MVP curve upwards 
and of the MFC curves downwards, through technical change or price changes. This may be seen 
as supporting different strands in the evolving orthodoxy of agricultural development policy 
emphasising agricultural research (to improve productivity), structural adjustment (to ‘get prices 
right’), institutional and property rights development (to reduce costs and risks of opportunism), 
infrastructural development (to lower costs and improve prices), and governance to reduce risks 
and costs from rent seeking. The framework provides an integration across different (and often 
analytically disconnected) strands of development, and assistance in asking questions about 
which strand is likely to be most critical in any particular situation. It can also help to answer 
questions about why development can proceed in some poor governance situations, for example, 
but not in others.  
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The second process by which actors may be assisted to escape from the low level equilibrium trap 
(‘pump priming investment’) represents the way in which government or donor investments in an 
economy, sector or supply chain may move total investment to the right in figure 4, by raising the 
level and density of economic activity and ‘thickening’ markets. This is perhaps the way that 
coordination problems are most commonly solved in cash crop systems, where a large 
commercial organisation invests in large specific assets and, to protect that investment, then 
invests in complementary service provision to smallholder farmers or actively invests in 
coordination in the supply chain.  
Such coordination represents the third process by which actors may escape from the low level 
equilibrium trap. Kydd and Dorward, 2004 classify non-market coordination mechanisms in 
terms of ‘local’ and ‘extensive’ coordination and discuss endogenous ‘local’ coordination 
mechanisms, vertical integration, local relations linking different local agents (through for 
example farmer groups or interlocking arrangements). Coordination may also be supported by 
external agents who assist ‘soft’ coordination processes (for example involving state or NGO 
support for the development of farmer organisations, for trader associations, or for contract 
grower, nucleus/ outgrower and other interlocking systems) or (b) more extensive ‘hard’ 
coordination where a strong central coordinating body with a mandate from the state ensures 
investments across the supply chain with highly credible coordinated commitments.  
The development of coordination mechanisms will be easier with a lower total supply chain 
investment threshold, as will pump priming investment.  This emphasises the importance of 
complementarity between the three processes identified for addressing low level equilibrium 
traps.  
If the basic analysis is accepted there are, however, still major empirical questions about the 
extent to which the conditions necessary for low level equilibria actually exist. Again the 
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literature cited above suggests first that these situations may be more common than is often  
recognised and second that even in the absence of low level equilibria, there are considerable 
potential gains to be had from paying greater attention to reductions in rent, commitment, and 
opportunism risks and costs.  Questions remain, however, about the nature, incidence and scale of 
these risks and costs, and about the most effective ways to reduce them. These are questions 
which need empirical investigation.   
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have examined the possible effects of coordination problems on economic 
development and pro-poor growth in poor rural areas. Economic coordination failures in poor 
rural areas have been largely ignored in policy analysis over the last 20 years, but we argue that 
they are crucial to our understanding of agricultural growth and hence of rural poverty reduction 
and the implementation and impacts of rural and agricultural development policies. Integration  of 
transaction cost and risk analysis into a conventional neoclassical production economics 
framework allows different (and often perceived as conflicting) state and market-led policy 
approaches to be seen as providing potentially complementary interventions for overcoming 
complexes of technical and institutional constraints holding back economic growth in poor 
economies. This therefore provides a theoretical basis for empirical study to support an inclusive, 
pragmatic pursuit of ‘developmental coordination’ (Dorward et al., 2005b) to ‘exploit the 
strengths of both state-led and market-led development approaches of the last 50 years or so 
while avoiding their respective weaknesses and addressing the particular challenges and 
opportunities of the beginning of the 21st century’ (Dorward et al., 2005b, p80). 
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Table 1 State and market-led agricultural development success and failure in poor rural 
economies 
 
 State-led approaches Market-led approaches 
 Staple crops Cash crops Staple 
crops 
Cash crops 
Success in 
stimulating 
sustainable 
intensification
Asian green 
revolution 
Some African 
successes (eg 
Kenya, Malawi, 
Zimbabwe) but 
not generally 
sustained 
Some African 
state 
marketing 
boards/ 
systems (eg 
Francophone 
cotton) 
???? South & East 
African cotton, 
Malawi tobacco 
(but note 
widespread & 
critical role for 
non-market  
coordination) 
Failure in 
stimulating 
sustainable 
intensification
Many African 
food crop 
marketing 
boards 
Many African 
state 
marketing 
boards/ 
systems 
Africa from 
1980s 
Some African 
cotton systems 
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Figure 1 Coordination Failure and the Low Level Equilibrium Trap 19 
 
Low economic activity: 
thin markets, high 
transaction costs & risks, & 
high unit costs 
Weak institutional 
& infrastructural 
environment 
High cost information 
access & property rights 
Inhibited market 
access & 
development.  
Inhibited economic & 
technological development 
30 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Farmer investments with and without coordinated transactions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 Seasonal capital investments in transformation costs ($)
Marginal factor 
costs (MFC)  
including 
transaction 
costs
Output risk & 
transaction 
cost adjusted 
marginal value 
product ($ / $ 
transformation 
cost invested) MVP0
MFC1
MVP1
MFC0
E
0
E
1
MFC = marginal factor cost including input transaction costs
MVP = output risk and transaction cost adjusted marginal value product
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 Figure 3a Farmer investments in thin (high transaction cost/risk) markets 
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Figure 3b Farmer investments with thick (low transaction cost/risk) markets 
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Figure 4a  High and low level equilibria with falling total MFC curve 
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Figure 4b  High and low level equilibria with ‘humped’ total MFC curve 
 
 
 
Endnotes 
                                                 
1
 We would be pleased to learn of any cases of widespread sustained intensification of staple crops within 
liberalized market systems. Ariga et al (2008) report some success with fertiliser use and maize 
intensification in Kenya in the context of a fertiliser industry that also serves a significant demand for cash 
production.  
2
 For example Poulton, C. et al., 2004 provide a discussion of these issues for cotton; the ‘liberalised’ 
Malawian smallholder tobacco system relies on a government owned company providing seasonal finance 
with a highly regulated single channel marketing system. 
3
 This observation is not of course restricted to poor rural economies, as the majority of OECD countries 
continue to intervene heavily in cereal markets. 
4
 In Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, almost all agriculture is small holder agriculture. It accounts for 
over a quarter of GDP (28 %) and nearly two thirds of the population is rural (65 %).  (Figures are 2005 
unweighted country averages taken from WDI 2007; South Africa is excluded). Agriculture’s employment 
MFC inc. opportunism costs & risks
MFC inc. commitment costs & risks
MFC inc. rents costs & risks
0
Total investments ($)
Marginal costs & 
returns ($ / $ 
invested)
‘Industry’ MVP
Base MFC: transformation 
costs & risks
feedbacksfeedbacks
A B C D
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share in 2000 was 59% in Sub-Saharan Africa and 53 % in Asia (population-weighted averages calculated 
from GGDC, 2008; India and China are excluded; in India the employment share was 78 %.) 
 
5
 We note, however, that recognition of the importance of the coordination aspect of exchange has often 
been more implicit than explicit. 
6
 Transaction costs are notoriously difficult to define. We recognise three different functions of transaction 
costs: costs incurred to protect oneself against risks of transaction failure (the focus of this paper); costs 
incurred to protect a contracting counter-party against transaction failure (to induce them to enter a 
contract);  and costs incurred in meeting licensing or other requirements of bureaucratic and rent seeking 
government agencies and officials. Reducing this last type of transaction cost is (rightly) an important focus 
of market liberalisation policies, but it is unfortunate when these different types of transaction cost are not 
distinguished from each other. Transaction costs of the first type and risks are considered together in this 
paper as actors are presumed to invest in transaction costs in order to reduce risks, but they are not able to 
completely eliminate transaction risks. Costs are therefore incurred to provide an optimal trade-off where 
the marginal transaction costs are equal to the marginal utility of risk reduction. 
7
 We define coordination as a process in which parties to a transaction are encouraged to take common or 
complementary actions necessary to overcome problems of commitment and opportunism to achieve 
individual goals. Commitment failure can be defined as “the failure of a potential investor to make an 
investment due to a possible absence of complementary investments by other parties to a transaction” 
(modified from Dorward  and Kydd, 2004). Commitment risks are then the risk of an investment failing 
due to a lack complementary investments by other parties to a transaction. Risks of opportunism, on the 
other hand, arise where another player with complementary investments (a) has an effective monopoly over 
a critical service and can capture an undue share of the revenue in a potential transaction, or (b) can deliver 
sub-standard goods or services whose quality cannot be easily assessed when entering a contract. We also 
distinguish between vertical coordination between parties to a transaction, as discussed by Williamson, and 
horizontal coordination between parties who do not transact directly with each other, but who all transact 
with another party (or parties), where favourable outcomes from these transactions are dependent on each 
other (see Poulton, C. et al., 2004). 
8
 Dorward, 2001builds on Williamson’s work to develop a formal model that integrates actors’ 
consideration of both transformation and transaction costs and risks in negotiated agreements regarding 
both the contractual forms and terms for particular transactions. This takes account of the attributes of the 
goods or services being transacted, asset specificity and thin markets, enforcement costs and risks of 
different contractual arrangements, and the attributes of the different parties to the transaction. 
9
  Buyers may also over-invest in buying capacity relative to supply, and be subject to opportunistic 
behaviour by suppliers, but we focus on the problems of producers to illustrate the development of our 
model.   
10
 Note that in figure 2 MFC of seasonal capital investments in transformation costs is greater than 1 due to 
transaction costs and risk associated with input financing and purchases. 
11
 Major costs will include labour, inputs (seed and at higher production levels labour) and land. 
12
 As noted earlier, transaction costs and risks are considered together as actors are presumed to invest in 
transaction costs in order to reduce risks, to provide an optimal trade-off. Different contractual forms or 
types of institutional arrangement provide different cost/risk tradeoffs, leading to different choices of 
institutional arrangement under different circumstances (see for example Dorward 2001). 
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13
 We note that separation of Rij and Iij in equation is not strictly correct, as they will be tied together in the 
risk function. Tying Rij and Iij  together, , however, makes the algebra unmanageable but does not affect the 
logic of the paper, and we therefore ignore it here and in subsequent equations. 
14
 Again we note that summation across separate players’ functions is not strictly correct, but it avoids 
substantial algebraic difficulties and again should not affect the validity of our arguments. 
15
 This however introduces a complex set of dynamics as existing extractors of rents may resist new rent 
seekers, and this may, for example, cause them to establish alliances with the economic agents from whom 
rents are being extracted (see for example Olsen’s discussion of mobile and stationary bandits (Olson, 
2000)). 
16
 This will occur if many players or potential players are considering making relatively small incremental 
investments with no overall coordination to cause the capture within investors’ individual decisions of the 
positive externalities of higher investment and the supply chain’s increasing returns to scale .  
17
 It is assumed here that there is a strong relationship between MVP and MFC across the aggregate supply 
chain on the one hand and MVP and MFC facing each actor on the other. This relationship is complex in 
thin markets. MFC will rise rapidly for any investments beyond current commitments if costs and risks are 
controlled by personal relationships with other supply chain actors. This will constrain significant 
investments away from a low level equilibrium investment position. High marginal transaction costs and 
risks facing actors with a critical  role in the supply chain will also lead to high marginal transaction costs 
and risks for other actors playing different roles, and hence constrain all actors and the whole supply chain.  
18
 Situations with MVP below MFC at zero investment are not uncommon in individual businesses, indeed 
MVP  and MFC curves are commonly shown this way in standard expositions of production economics 
(e.g. Ellis, 1993) but in these expositions the management of the firm provides the coordination necessary 
to move investment to the high level equilibrium. Such coordination is lacking in supply chains without 
some form of non-market vertical coordination.  
19
 from Dorward et al., 2005a 
